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Budget Making in a Democracy: A New View of Budget Making. By EDWARD A. FITZPATRICK. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.—x, 317 pp.

This is clearly a work of advocacy. What is advocated, however, the reader is left to surmise until he is well on toward the end of the book. While the author opens with Gladstone's frequently quoted statement of the fundamental importance of a budget and says that it "admirably expresses the point of view of this book", the reader finds that the point of view is taken for granted or is left with but brief elaboration. The first three chapters are devoted to an attack on "the executive budget idea". In the chapters which follow the arraignment is continued, and joined with it is an attack on "the legislative budget idea." Intertwined with these criticisms and in the "conclusion", is found the "new view", which, in fact, represents such parts of the executive budget idea (elaborated by "its principal and most intelligent expositor . . . in the United States") as, in the opinion of the author, is suited to that form of decentralized administration by boards and commissions which is typified by the state organization of Wisconsin.

How clearly the author follows the proposals of the "expositor" of the executive budget idea referred to, may be best seen from his final summary (pages 292-298): (1) "Each subdivision of each of the departments shall organize its experience in terms of budget proposals for submission to the departmental heads"; (2) "The departmental head reviews these budget estimates in the light both of his experience and of his judgment and passes the result along"; (3) "The estimates are transmitted to the executive. . . . He must view departmental estimates and national or state needs in the light of the financial resources of the nation or state. This coördination is the duty of the executive"; (4) "The budget proposals are presented to the legislature"; (5) In order that the members may have the benefit of painstaking scrutiny and consideration when the estimates are taken up in the legislature, it is proposed that there shall be created within the legislature a single appropriation committee for the majority and "a committee of criticism . . . to collect reliable information without relying on the routine administrative machinery" in the hands of the minority, the minority to have the right "to summon administrative officers before the bar of the legislative house . . . [to] answer specific questions, particularly on subjects and aspects of questions upon which the administration did not voluntarily supply full information with the budget proposals"; (6) In order that there may be fullest discussion and publicity, use must be made of the committee-

of-the-whole procedure, all barriers to inquiry, criticism and argument must be removed by "rules reform both of committee procedure and of floor discussion", the "limit placed upon the length of legislative session" must be removed, "the privilege of the floor" must be extended "to proper administrative officers so that budget proposals may be adequately presented to the legislature and adequately defended by the makers of the proposals" and the public must be "invited to participate in the legislative consideration of the budget committee-of-the-whole"; (7) Finally, all financial measures are to be brought together as one piece of legislation.

This is the "new idea" which is put forward as "a practical budget procedure" which may be adopted "within the present limits of our government and within its present character", with "no need for constitutional amendments." On the other hand, "the so-called executive budget program proposes a shifting of the center of gravity of our government. Its tendency would be toward autocratic executive power."

In view of the fact that every one of these proposals enumerated (except the public hearings in committee-of-the-whole) has been taken bodily from the executive budget propaganda, the chief subject of attack, we must now look for variants. These are of two kinds: executive budget proposals eliminated by the author because they tend to "autocracy"; and executive budget proposals which are not mentioned, the purpose of which is to make the executive responsible—to prevent autocracy. The proposals for the executive budget which have been eliminated as an "insidious" method of establishing an autocracy are these: (1) the appearance in person of the chief executive or some one of his choice before a committee-of-the-whole of the representative branch, and, where the constitution admits, the presentation, discussion and defence by him of the budget on the floor in regular session, without a right to vote; (2) insistence on a separate vote on the amount requested for each service or office, to find out where the members stand; (3) the right of the executive to correct or amend while the proposals are under discussion; (4) denial of the right of the legislature to increase amounts requested or to add new items, except by separate bill. The aim of these proposals is to enable the people to follow the proceedings and to think clearly about what is going on—to define and locate responsibility and avoid the confusion of issues. They are, however, characterized by the writer as vicious and undemocratic. "Autocrats are made this way, but not leaders". He asks, "Are we to have one-man government? That is the fundamental question back of the executive budget propaganda."

The proposals which have been ignored and treated as non-existent are those which provide for popular control over the legislature as well as the executive. This subject is despatched as follows: "The saving element in its theory [that underlying the executive budget's] is ultimate popular control. Any government under effective popular control would be accepted as democratic. But no feasible scheme has been proposed in theory for the exercise of popular control." This statement does violence to the facts. If it had been said that the author himself makes no such provision in his "new view", that no advocate of the "legislative budget" has made provision for popular control, that not a single advocate of government by boards and commissions has made such a proposal, that none of the changes in statutes and constitutions to the present time have dealt with the subject—the statement would have had the ring of historic accuracy. But the fact is that proponents of the executive budget are the only ones who have proposed a method of popular control. Their only reason for making proposals which look toward locating and defining responsibility has been to enable the people to know what they are voting for or against when an appeal is made to them. Furthermore, the proponents of the executive budget have gone so far as to say that until such provision is made, no form of budget procedure can give us responsible government.

The gist of the author's preaching is this: "Without any feasible scheme of enforcing responsibility to the electorate we have made our government irresponsible—a constitutional autocrat for a definite term without any possibility of control." Since we cannot have responsible government, then a decentralized administration under independent boards and commissions is a thing to be preferred. Therefore a budget procedure must be devised which will perpetuate this form of irresponsible government. If the American people are ready to accept the conclusion that we cannot have responsible government, then the author's proposal is to be commended.

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NORWOOD, MASSACHUSETTS.

France Facing Germany. By GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, translated by ERNEST HUNTER WRIGHT. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1919.—xxix, 396 pp.

This book is made up of two speeches, delivered in 1908 and 1911, and a number of newspaper articles published in *L'Homme Libre*, from May, 1913, to December, 1914, and in *L'Homme Enchaîné*, from October, 1914, to May, 1916. Clemenceau's paper having been